FAILURE OF COSTA RICAN REVOLT

- I. Apparent failure of Costa Rican revolt clearly in US interest--NOT because of merits or demerits of governments concerned, but because successful repetition of "Guatemala-type" coup would have provided dangerous precedent.
- II. As to specifics in Costa Rica -
 - A. Only area still held by rebels is in extreme northwest.
 - 1. Have some 500 men in area of La Cruz.
 - B. Against these, government has about 1,400 troops from town of Liberia northward some 30 miles.
 - Government announced on 18 January that it had pushed rebels back north of Santa Rosa.
 - Government unit reported preparing to cut rebel escape route north of La Cruz.
 - C. Rebel "air force" collapsing.
 - Transport (C-47), piloted by American Jerry Delarm, destroyed in crash landing.
 - 2. Two AT-6's returned to Nicaragua, spotted by OAS observers, after which President Somoza sheepishly "interned" them.
 - Fighter (?-47) has disappeared and is believed to be back in Guatemala.

4.	Thus.	little	threat	of	further	rebel	air	action.
- •	,							

MENNEY NO.	
IO CHANGE IN CLASIR. ET	25X1
NEW FARMED TO: TS & C	
NUTTHE ARE TO SERVICE AND THE	/

- III. Internal support for rebels didn't develop.
 - A. Majority of Costa Ricans have no love for former presidents Calderon Guardia and Picado (in whose names rebels acting), because of their:
 - 1. Opportunistic alliance with Communists in 1944-48.
 - 2. Close association with Somoza since 1948.
 - 3. Dictatorial tendencies.

25X6

25X6

- B. Costa Ricans generally support government.
 - Even followers of Ulate (opposition leader and former president) have volunteered to fight "invaders."
 - 2. Ulate, like Figueres, is old enemy of Calderon and Picado.
- * C. No defections reported from Civil Guard, which led by men of unquestioned loyalty to Figueres.
- IV. Collapse of revolt will not end bad blood between Costa Rica and neighbors.

Α.	Nicaraguan	and	Venezuelan	leaders,	who	sponsored	revolt,
	still deter	mine	ed eliminate	Figuere	s		


B. Somoza of Nicaragua himself a target for assassins.

Opposition (Conservative Party) allegedly plotting

against	bim-	
	'	

V. Prompt action has raised OAS prestige, although Latin "dictators" resent what they consider US "intervention."

- A. Venezuela, Nicaragua, Dominican Republic may claim action was interference.
- B. However, others--notably Uruguay, Ecuador--and
 "liberal-democratic" opinion throughout hemisphere
 will support OAS action.



19 Jan ary 1956


COSTA RICAN REVOLT

- I. Apparent failure Costa Rican revolt
 clearly in US interest-NOT because of
 merits or demerits governments concerned,
 but because successful repetition
 "Guatemala-type" coup would be dangerous
 precedent.
- II. As to specifics in Costa Rica -
 - A. Only rebel area left is in extreme northwest.
 - 1. 500 men in area of La Cruz.
 - B. Government moving against these, with 1,400 troops (from town of Liberia northward some 30 miles).
 - Government announced (18 Jan)
 rebels pushed back north of
 Santa Rosa.
 - Government hopes cut rebel escape route north of La Cruz.

SECRIT

Approved Release 2002/05/07 : CIA-RDP79R00890A000500010042-5

- C. Rebel "air force" collapsing.
 - 1. Transport (C-47), piloted by
 American Jerry Delarm, destroyed
 in crash landing.
 - 2. Two AT-6's returned to Nicaragua, spotted by OAS observers, after which President Somoza sheepishly "interned" them.
 - Fighter (F-47) has disappeared-believed back in Guatemala.
 - 4. Thus, little threat further rebel air action.
- III. Internal support for rebels didn't develop.
 - A. Majority Costa Ricans have no love for former presidents Calderon Guardia and Picado (in whose names rebels acting), due their:
 - 1. Alliance Communists '44-48.
 - 2. Close association Somoza since '48.
 - 3. Dictatorial tendencies.



- Costa Ricans generally support government.
 - 1. Even followers of Ulate (opposition leader, ex-president) volunteered fight "invaders."
 - 2. Ulate, like Figueres, old enemy Calderon/Picado.
- C. No defections reported from Civil Guard, which led by men loyal to . Figueres.
- IV. Revolt's end does not mean end bad blood between Costa Rica and neighbors.

25X6

Nicaraguan, Venezuelan leaders still determined eliminate Figueres.

В. Somoza of Nicaragua himself a target

25X6	for assassins. Opposition (Conservative Party) allegedly plotting against him

25X6

Approved For Release 2002/05/07 : CIA-RDP



The maps action has raised AS prestige, although Latin "dictate" resent what they consider Us "intervention."

- Yenezuela, Nicaragua, Dominican Republic may claim action was interterence.
- E. However, others--notably Uruguay,

 Ecuador--and "liberal-democratic"

 opinion throughout hemisphere

 will support OAS action.